Why this setup?

Security needs to cover more than just the source code. Each tool in this lab has a specific role, from finding issues early to enforcing policies and detecting problems at runtime.

This post builds on the otel labs infrastructure and implements security across two repositories:

Application Repo (otel-labs) — application security from source code through container images
Platform Repo (otel-labs-platform) — infrastructure security, Kubernetes policy enforcement, runtime detection, and testing of the deployed application

arch

Project Overview

The separation is intentional. The application repository owns the security of the application and the artifacts it produces, while the platform repository owns the security of the infrastructure and the workloads that are deployed and run. Although OWASP ZAP is an application-security tool, we keep its workflow in the platform repository because the scan runs against the deployed application, and this lets us use the github-actions[bot] commit condition from the GitOps deployment flow to trigger the scan at the right point.

Note: ZAP was originally an OWASP project and is now an independent open-source project supported by Checkmarx. This article still uses OWASP ZAP because the name remains widely recognized.

Part I: Application Security
Part II: Platform Security
Part III: General Concepts & End-to-End Flow
Deployment & Setup
Key Takeaways
Troubleshooting
Next Steps
References

Part I: Application Security {#part-i}

The otel-labs repository contains the application code for the three services:

Node.js frontend
Python orders service
Go inventory service

The application side of the project is about protecting the code and the artifacts it produces before they move into the platform.

We use four layers here:

Source repository
      ↓
Gitleaks
      ↓
Semgrep
      ↓
Trivy FS
      ↓
Build container images
      ↓
Trivy Image
      ↓
GHCR

1. Gitleaks: Secret Detection

The first check is for something that can cause an immediate problem if it gets committed: credentials and other secrets. We check both the current repository and Git history because deleting a secret from the latest version does not remove it from an older commit.

We use Gitleaks for both checks.

File: .github/workflows/gitleaks.yml

name: Gitleaks

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
    paths-ignore:
      - '**/*.md'
      - '.gitignore'
      - 'LICENSE'

permissions:
  contents: read
  security-events: write

jobs:
  gitleaks:
    name: Secret Scan
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest

    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
        uses: actions/checkout@v4
        with:
          fetch-depth: 0

      - name: Run Gitleaks (git history)
        uses: gitleaks/gitleaks-action@e0c47f4f8be36e29cdc102c57e68cb5cbf0e8d1e
        env:
          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
          GITLEAKS_ENABLE_UPLOAD_ARTIFACT: true
          GITLEAKS_ENABLE_SUMMARY: true

      - name: Run Gitleaks (full filesystem)
        if: always()
        run: |
          docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/path" ghcr.io/gitleaks/gitleaks:latest \
            dir /path --report-format sarif \
            --report-path /path/gitleaks-fs.sarif --exit-code 0

      - name: Upload SARIF to GitHub Security
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
        with:
          sarif_file: gitleaks-fs.sarif
          category: gitleaks-fs

      - name: Upload to DefectDojo
        if: always()
        run: |
          curl -X POST \
            "${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_URL }}/api/v2/reimport-scan/" \
            -H "Authorization: Token ${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_API_KEY }}" \
            -H "Accept: application/json" \
            -F "scan_type=SARIF" \
            -F "file=@gitleaks-fs.sarif" \
            -F "product_type_name=SP Org" \
            -F "product_name=Otel Labs" \
            -F "engagement_name=App Sec Engagement" \
            -F "test_title=Gitleaks"

The workflow therefore gives us two views:

Git history — secrets committed in the past
Filesystem — secrets present in the repository now

The findings are written as SARIF for GitHub Security and sent to DefectDojo. The filesystem scan uses exit-code: 0, so it reports findings without blocking the workflow.

2. Semgrep: SAST

The next check looks at our own source code. A lot of security problems can be found without running the application at all. This is the idea behind SAST (Static Application Security Testing).

Semgrep analyzes the Node.js, Python, and Go code for insecure patterns. In this project we use its automatic configuration and export the results as SARIF.

File: .github/workflows/semgrep.yml

name: Semgrep

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]
    paths:
      - 'node-frontend/**'
      - 'python-orders/**'
      - 'go-inventory/**'

permissions:
  ....
  ....

jobs:
  semgrep:
    name: SAST Scan
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest

    container:
      image: semgrep/semgrep

    steps:
      .....
      .....

      - name: Run Semgrep
        continue-on-error: true
        run: |
          semgrep scan --config auto --sarif --output semgrep.sarif .

      - name: Upload SARIF to GitHub Security
        if: always()
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
        with:
          sarif_file: semgrep.sarif

      - name: Upload to DefectDojo
        if: always()
        run: |
          curl -X POST \
            "${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_URL }}/api/v2/reimport-scan/" \
            -H "Authorization: Token ${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_API_KEY }}" \
            -H "Accept: application/json" \
            -F "scan_type=SARIF" \
            -F "file=@semgrep.sarif" \
            -F "product_type_name=SP Org" \
            -F "product_name=Otel Labs" \
            -F "engagement_name=App Sec Engagement" \
            -F "test_title=Semgrep"

The scan covers the application source itself. It is different from secret scanning: Gitleaks asks whether sensitive values have been exposed, while Semgrep looks for insecure coding patterns.

Dependabot: Automated Dependency Updates

While Trivy detects vulnerable dependencies, Dependabot automatically creates pull requests to update them.

Dependabot is GitHub's native SCA tool that monitors your dependency files and creates PRs when updates are available.

File: .github/dependabot.yml

version: 2

updates:
  # Node.js/npm dependencies
  - package-ecosystem: npm
    directory: /node-frontend
    schedule:
      interval: weekly
    open-pull-requests-limit: 10

  # Python dependencies
  - package-ecosystem: pip
    directory: /python-orders
    schedule:
      interval: weekly
    open-pull-requests-limit: 10

  # Go dependencies
  - package-ecosystem: gomod
    directory: /go-inventory
    ....
    ....

  # GitHub Actions
  - package-ecosystem: github-actions
    directory: /
    ....
    ....

How it works:

Dependabot scans package.json, requirements.txt, go.mod, and GitHub Actions workflows. When a newer version is available, it automatically creates a pull request.

Each PR triggers your existing security scanning workflows (Gitleaks, Semgrep, Trivy), so the updated dependencies are validated before merging.

Enable in your repository: - Settings → Code security and analysis → Dependabot alerts

Toggle on:

✅ Dependabot alerts
✅ Dependabot security updates
✅ Dependabot version updates

GH SCA

PR by Dependabot SCA

What Trivy does in this lab for SCA:

While Dependabot handles automatic updates, Trivy FS provides active vulnerability scanning:

Trivy scans every commit for known CVEs in dependencies
Reports HIGH/CRITICAL vulnerabilities immediately
Does not automatically create PRs (just reports findings)
Complements Dependabot by catching vulnerabilities before they're fixed

The two can work together:

Trivy FS
↓
Detects vulnerable dependencies
↓
Reports to GitHub Security + DefectDojo
↓
Dependabot
↓
Creates update PRs
↓
Merge and re-scan with Trivy

This gives you both visibility and automation for dependency management.

3. Trivy FS: Dependency / SCA Scanning

Our application also depends on packages we did not write ourselves. A vulnerability in an npm package, Python dependency, or Go module can therefore become a vulnerability in our application.

This is the area covered by SCA (Software Composition Analysis) or dependency scanning.

We use Trivy's filesystem scan to check the repository before the application is turned into its final container image.

Included in: .github/workflows/build-scan-push.yml — runs before the image build step so vulnerabilities in dependencies are caught before the final artifact is produced.

For this project, the relevant inputs include:

package.json for the Node.js application
requirements.txt for Python
go.mod for Go
Dockerfile-related configuration

This gives us an early dependency/configuration check before we deal with the final container artifact.

4. Trivy Image: Container Scanning

The repository scan is not the same as scanning the image that will actually run. Once the containers are built, the final artifact contains the application plus its base image, OS packages, and installed application packages.

So we scan the images themselves with Trivy Image.

File: .github/workflows/build-scan-push.yml

name: Build, Scan and Push Images

on:
  push:
    ....
    ....

jobs:
  build-scan-push:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    env:
      GHCR_OWNER: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
      TRIVY_CONFIG: .trivy/config.yaml

    steps:
      -....
       ....

      - name: Scan node-frontend image
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@v0.36.0
        with:
          image-ref: ghcr.io/${{ env.GHCR_OWNER }}/node-frontend:latest
          format: sarif
          output: trivy-node-frontend.sarif
          trivy-config: ${{ env.TRIVY_CONFIG }}
          exit-code: 0

      # ... repeat for python-orders, go-inventory, otel-collector

      - name: Upload node-frontend SARIF
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
        with:
          sarif_file: trivy-node-frontend.sarif
          category: trivy-node-frontend-image
          delete-old-findings: true

      - name: Upload node-frontend to DefectDojo
        if: always()
        run: |
          curl -X POST \
            "${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_URL }}/api/v2/reimport-scan/" \
            -H "Authorization: Token ${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_API_KEY }}" \
            -H "Accept: application/json" \
            -F "scan_type=SARIF" \
            -F "file=@trivy-node-frontend.sarif" \
            -F "product_type_name=SP Org" \
            -F "product_name=Otel Labs" \
            -F "engagement_name=App Sec Engagement" \
            -F "test_title=Trivy Node Frontend Image"

      - name: Push latest images
        run: docker compose push

      - name: Create GitOps commit
        run: |
          # Update platform repo with new image tags
          # This triggers platform repo security scans

Our Trivy configuration focuses the SARIF output on HIGH and CRITICAL findings:

File: .trivy/config.yml

severity:
  - HIGH
  - CRITICAL

scanners:
  - vuln
  - misconfig

format: sarif

vulnerability:
  ignore-unfixed: true

limit-severities-for-sarif: true

The images covered by the workflow are:

node-frontend
python-orders
go-inventory
otel-collector

The results go to GitHub Security and DefectDojo, and the images are pushed to GHCR as part of the workflow.

At this point the application repository has completed its security checks and produces the container images consumed by the platform repository.

workflow in app repo

workflows in app repo

Part II: Platform Security {#part-ii}

The platform repository is where the application moves into its Kubernetes environment. It contains the Terraform infrastructure, Kubernetes manifests, security policies, Falco configuration, and the workflow used to test the deployed application.

The platform-side flow is:

otel-labs-platform
        ↓
Gitleaks
        ↓
Trivy Config
        ↓
ArgoCD / Kubernetes
        ↓
Kyverno
        ↓
Falco
        ↓
OWASP ZAP

1. Gitleaks: Platform Repository

The same secret problem exists in the platform repository. Terraform files, Kubernetes manifests and GitOps configuration can contain sensitive values too, so the platform repo needs its own secret scan.

The implementation is the same idea as the application repository: scan the repository and its history, produce SARIF, and send the result to the security systems.

2. Trivy Config: Terraform and Kubernetes

Once the application reaches the platform repository, we are looking at a different class of problems.

Here the question is not whether a package has a CVE. It is whether the infrastructure or Kubernetes configuration is unsafe.

For example:

an unencrypted EBS volume
an overly open security group
a container running with unsafe settings
missing resource limits

This is where Trivy Config is useful.

File: .github/workflows/trivy.yml

name: Trivy Config Scan

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]

permissions:
  contents: read
  security-events: write

jobs:
  trivy-k8s:
    ....

    steps:
      - ...

      - name: Scan Kubernetes manifests
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@v0.36.0
        with:
          scan-type: config
          scan-ref: ./k8s
          trivy-config: .trivy/config.yaml
          format: sarif
          output: trivy-k8s.sarif
          severity: HIGH,CRITICAL
          exit-code: 0

      - name: Upload Kubernetes SARIF to GitHub Security
        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
        with:
          sarif_file: trivy-k8s.sarif
          category: trivy-k8s

      - name: Upload to DefectDojo
        if: always()
        run: |
          curl -X POST \
            "${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_URL }}/api/v2/reimport-scan/" \
            ....
            ....

  trivy-terraform:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest

    steps:
      - ....

      - name: Scan Terraform
        uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@v0.36.0
        with:
          scan-type: config
          scan-ref: ./terraform
          trivy-config: .trivy/config.yaml
          format: sarif
          output: trivy-terraform.sarif
          severity: HIGH,CRITICAL
          exit-code: 0

      - name: Upload Terraform SARIF to GitHub Security
        ....
        ....

      - name: Upload to DefectDojo
        if: always()
        run: |
          curl -X POST \
            ....
            ....

We therefore run two configuration scans:

Terraform
   ↓
Trivy Config
   ↓
Infrastructure findings

Kubernetes
   ↓
Trivy Config
   ↓
Workload/configuration findings

The scan can find configuration problems such as:

HIGH: EBS Volume Not Encrypted
HIGH: Pod Running as Root
MEDIUM: Missing Resource Limits

The important point is that this is a configuration check, not the same thing as scanning an application dependency or container image.

workflow in platform repo

workflows in platform repo

The Platforms

Before looking at the remaining platform controls, it helps to understand the three ideas behind them: admission control, runtime detection, and centralized findings management.

Runtime Security: Falco

Admission control is useful for controlling what enters the cluster, but it doesn't tell us what a workload actually does after it starts.

That is where runtime security comes in.

Falco watches activity on the running system and evaluates it against security rules.

The basic idea is:

Running workload
      ↓
Kernel activity
      ↓
Syscalls
      ↓
Falco
      ↓
Rules
      ↓
Security event

Syscalls

A process does not directly perform most privileged operations on the Linux system. It requests them through system calls (syscalls) exposed by the kernel.

Opening a file, creating a process, changing permissions, creating a network connection and many other operations eventually involve syscalls. That makes syscall activity useful for runtime security because it gives us a view of what processes are actually doing on the host.

For example, a command such as cat /etc/shadow results in file-access activity that Falco can observe and evaluate against its rules.

eBPF

eBPF (extended Berkeley Packet Filter) is a Linux technology that allows programs to run small pieces of code safely inside the kernel without modifying the kernel itself.

For security tools such as Falco, eBPF can be used to observe activity happening at the kernel level, including system calls and other events generated by processes.

In simple terms:

Application / Container
        ↓
   System activity
        ↓
      Linux Kernel
        ↓
       eBPF
        ↓
       Falco
        ↓
      Falco Rules
        ↓
   Security Event

The important connection is that eBPF is one way Falco can collect the low-level runtime events it needs for detection. Falco then evaluates those events against its rules and generates an alert when activity matches a rule.

Falco rules

Falco turns those runtime events into security detections using rules.

We worked through:

built-in rules
Kubernetes-specific rules
custom rules
rule matching
runtime process activity such as kubectl exec

For example, kubectl exec can result in a process being started inside a running container. That gives us a concrete runtime event to investigate with Falco.

We also used FalcoSidekick as the output/forwarding component for Falco events.

Try it manually

Falco can be tested in both the local environment and the Kubernetes environment.

For the Kubernetes deployment, use the Node frontend or any app pod as the test workload.

First, identify the Node frontend pod and the Kubernetes node it is running on:

kctl get pods -n otel-labs -o wide

The Node frontend was running on:

node-frontend-7589db9c99-nv2v7   1/1   Running   ...   ip-10-0-1-116.ap-south-1.compute.internal

Now identify the Falco pod running on the same node:

kctl get pods -n falco -o wide

The matching Falco pod was:

falco-z6vwk   2/2   Running   ...   ip-10-0-1-116.ap-south-1.compute.internal

Both pods are therefore running on:

ip-10-0-1-116.ap-south-1.compute.internal

This is important because Falco's syscall monitoring is node-local. The Falco instance running on the same node as the workload is the one that can observe its process activity.

Keep two terminals open.

In Terminal 1, watch the matching Falco pod:

kctl logs -f -n falco falco-z6vwk -c falco

In Terminal 2, execute whoami inside the Node frontend container:

kctl exec -n otel-labs node-frontend-7589db9c99-nv2v7 -- whoami

The command executes successfully, and Falco detects the process execution with the custom rule:

CUSTOM ALERT: whoami executed in container

falco alert

custom alert triggered on match

The alert includes details such as the process, command, container name, image, namespace, and pod name.

This demonstrates Falco detecting process execution inside a real Kubernetes application container.

Note: kubectl exec works even when the container uses a read-only root filesystem. readOnlyRootFilesystem: true prevents filesystem writes; it does not prevent executing processes.

Local — Falco and Falcosidekick

The local setup provides a second demonstration using Falco and Falcosidekick.

Then try accessing a sensitive file:

sudo cat /etc/shadow

Falco's built-in rule for sensitive file access should detect the attempt and generate an event.

You can also create custom rules and have them run for example using whoami or ls etc for understanding it before implementing in k8s.

~$ cat /etc/falco/falco_rules.local.yaml
# Your custom rules!
- rule: Falco Lab Whoami
  desc: Detect whoami execution
  condition: spawned_process and proc.name = whoami
  output: "FALCO LAB: whoami executed | user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline"
  priority: EMERGENCY
  tags: [falco_lab, identity]

- rule: Falco Lab LS
  desc: Detect ls execution
  condition: spawned_process and proc.name = ls
  output: "FALCO LAB: ls executed | user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline"
  priority: ALERT
  tags: [falco_lab, filesystem]

- rule: Falco Lab ID
  desc: Detect id execution
  condition: spawned_process and proc.name = id
  output: "FALCO LAB: id executed | user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline"
  priority: ERROR
  tags: [falco_lab, identity]

- rule: Falco Lab Uname
  desc: Detect uname execution
  condition: spawned_process and proc.name = uname
  output: "FALCO LAB: uname executed | user=%user.name command=%proc.cmdline"
  priority: WARNING
  tags: [falco_lab, system]

The resulting events can be viewed through the Falcosidekick UI.

falco sidekick

falco sidekick ui view

There is an important catch in the Kubernetes setup, though: the OTel Labs deployments run with security restrictions such as non-root execution and read-only filesystems. Therefore, attempting to access /etc/shadow from those containers may fail because the process does not have permission to read the file in the first place.

That is actually a useful point. Runtime security is one layer, but we can also prevent this kind of activity from being possible in the first place.

That brings us to Kubernetes admission control.

Kubernetes Admission Control: Kyverno

Falco watches what happens after a workload is running. But what if we could stop an insecure workload from entering the cluster in the first place?

That is where Kubernetes admission control comes in.

When the Kubernetes API server receives a request to create or modify a resource, admission controllers can inspect that request before Kubernetes accepts it.

kubectl apply
      ↓
Kubernetes API Server
      ↓
Admission
      ↓
Admission Controller
      ↓
Allow / Reject / Modify

Kyverno is a Kubernetes-native policy engine that can be used to validate, mutate, generate, and verify resources as part of this process.

What can Kyverno do?

Kyverno policies can be used for several different jobs:

Validate — check whether a resource follows a rule
Mutate — modify a resource to bring it into the desired state
Generate — create additional Kubernetes resources based on a policy
Verify images — verify image signatures and attestations

For validation policies, Kyverno can either report a violation or prevent the resource from being admitted.

Audit vs Enforce

For a validation rule, Kyverno provides two failure actions:

Audit
  ↓
Violation is reported
  ↓
Resource is still allowed

Enforce
  ↓
Violation is detected
  ↓
Resource is rejected

The policy can therefore start in Audit mode while we understand its impact and later move to Enforce when we are ready to make the rule mandatory.

The current syntax is:

spec:
  background: true
  validationFailureAction: Enforce

Policy as code

The important part is that these security requirements can be written as Kubernetes policies instead of being maintained as documentation that developers are expected to follow manually.

The policies can live in Git and be managed through the same GitOps process as the rest of the platform:

Git
 ↓
Kyverno Policy
 ↓
ArgoCD
 ↓
Kubernetes
 ↓
Kyverno
 ↓
Admission decision

This also means policy changes can go through version control, review, and the same deployment process as other platform changes.

Policy exceptions

Enforcing a policy across an entire cluster can sometimes affect workloads that have a legitimate reason to be different.

Instead of weakening the policy globally, Kyverno supports PolicyExceptions that can be scoped to specific resources and specific policy rules.

For example:

General policy
     ↓
Applies to workloads
     ↓
Specific legitimate exception
     ↓
PolicyException
     ↓
Only that resource/rule is excluded

The idea is to keep the main policy strong while making exceptions explicit and limited.

What we will enforce in this lab

Now that the admission-control concepts are clear, we can apply them to our EKS environment.

In this lab, we will use Kyverno to enforce rules such as:

images must have explicit tags
:latest is not allowed
CPU and memory requests are required
CPU and memory limits are required
images must come from trusted registries

kyverno policies

kyverno policies

We will use Enforce for these validation policies, so workloads that violate the rules are rejected during admission.

We will also use a scoped PolicyException where a legitimate platform component, such as Traefik, needs an exception from one of the general policies.

Policy exceptions

Strict policies can also affect legitimate platform components.

For example, our Traefik deployment does not satisfy every generic policy requirement, so instead of turning the policy off globally, we use a scoped PolicyException.

That is an important Kubernetes policy concept:

Make the exception explicit and narrow rather than weakening the policy for everything.

Try it manually

Now we can see admission control in action.

Try creating a pod using the latest tag:

kubectl run test-pod \
  --image nginx:latest \
  -n otel-labs

With our policy enabled, the request is rejected because :latest is not allowed.

A compliant workload with an explicitly tagged image and the required resources can be admitted.

There's also a test workload under archive/falco-trigger.yml. You can use it to test the policies because its image comes from the trusted registry already allowed by our policy.

First apply the workload by commenting anything that violates policy like requests and limits or namespace. You would see that it would fail with violations shows, if you uncomment them and try again, it is compliant and would work just fine.

kyverno policie test

kyverno compliance

This gives us two different security layers:

Kyverno
   ↓
Controls what is allowed into the cluster
   ↓
Running workload
   ↓
Falco
   ↓
Watches what happens at runtime

Kyverno and Falco therefore solve different problems:

Kyverno prevents or restricts workloads at admission time.
Falco detects suspicious activity while workloads are running.

Centralized Findings: DefectDojo

The scanners all answer different security questions, and each one produces its own results.

If we leave them separate, we have to check Gitleaks, Semgrep, Trivy and ZAP individually to understand what is happening across the project.

defectdojo

DD dashboard

DefectDojo gives us one place to collect and manage those findings.

It is not another scanner. The scanners do the actual detection; DefectDojo receives, organizes and tracks their results.

How DefectDojo setup is organized

In the DefectDojo UI, the hierarchy is:

Organization → Asset → Engagement → Test → Findings

For this project:

Organization: SP Org
Asset: Otel Labs
Engagements:
- App Sec Engagement
- Platform Sec Engagement
Tests: individual scanner results within each Engagement
Findings: security issues reported by those Tests

For example, the application-security side contains Tests for Gitleaks, Semgrep, Trivy and OWASP ZAP, while the platform-security side contains Tests for Gitleaks, Trivy Kubernetes and Trivy Terraform.

Each Test represents a particular security scan within an Engagement, and the findings produced by that scan are associated with that Test.

UI vs API

When we work in the DefectDojo UI, we use the hierarchy above.

When we automate the same process from GitHub Actions, the API uses different field names:

product_type_name = SP Org
product_name      = Otel Labs
engagement_name   = App Sec Engagement
test_title        = Gitleaks
scan_type         = SARIF
file              = scanner-result.sarif

The API terminology does not map one-to-one to the labels we see in the current UI, so it is useful to keep the two views separate.

Reimporting scan results

Our workflows use the reimport-scan API so that new results from the same scanner can be imported back into the corresponding DefectDojo Test.

This keeps the scanner results associated with the same Test over time instead of creating an unrelated Test for every workflow run.

Before automating this, you can understand the structure directly in the UI by going through:

SP Org → Otel Labs → App Sec Engagement → Test → Findings

The platform scans follow the same structure under Platform Sec Engagement.

tests

one tool as a test finding

individual findings

Automating DefectDojo from GitHub Actions

Once the DefectDojo structure makes sense, the GitHub Actions workflow can automate the import.

For example, our ZAP workflow sends its report to the DefectDojo reimport-scan API:

curl -X POST \
  "${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_URL }}/api/v2/reimport-scan/" \
  -H "Authorization: Token ${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_API_KEY }}" \
  -H "Accept: application/json" \
  -F "scan_type=ZAP Scan" \
  -F "file=@report_xml.xml" \
  -F "auto_create_context=true" \
  -F "product_type_name=$DD_PRODUCT_TYPE" \
  -F "product_name=$DD_PRODUCT" \
  -F "engagement_name=$DD_ENGAGEMENT" \
  -F "test_title=OWASP ZAP DAST" \
  -F "close_old_findings=true" \
  -F "do_not_reactivate=false" \
  -F "environment=$DD_ENVIRONMENT" \
  -F "build_id=$DD_BUILD_ID" \
  -F "branch_tag=$DD_BRANCH" \
  -F "commit_hash=$DD_COMMIT" \
  -F "tags=github-actions,zap,dast,$DD_BRANCH"

The request handles several things in one call: it authenticates via the API token secret, identifies where to store the result using product_type_name, product_name, engagement_name, and test_title, uploads the actual ZAP XML report, passes build metadata (environment, branch, commit, build ID) for traceability, tags the import for easy filtering, and uses auto_create_context=true so DefectDojo creates the required hierarchy automatically on first run.

engagements

auto created engagements zap finding

one of the zap finding

Closing and reactivating findings

The reimport also controls what happens to findings from earlier scans.

-F "close_old_findings=true"
-F "do_not_reactivate=false"

close_old_findings=true tells DefectDojo to close old findings that are no longer present in the newly imported scan.

do_not_reactivate=false allows a previously closed finding to become active again if a later scan reports it.

Note: We currently use close_old_findings=true with DefectDojo reimport. This can be too aggressive in our setup, causing many previous findings to be closed when they are not present in the latest scan result, even though their absence does not necessarily mean they have been fixed. This is a known issue we are still investigating and tuning. ◉ DefectDojo issue #14205.

GitHub Security and Workflow Artifacts

DefectDojo is not the only place where we keep the scanner results.

For scanners that produce SARIF output, we also upload the results to the GitHub Security tab.

This gives us two different views:

Scanner
   ↓
SARIF
   ├──→ GitHub Security
   │
   └──→ DefectDojo

GitHub Security is useful for seeing security findings directly alongside the repository and its pull requests, while DefectDojo gives us the centralized view across the different scanners and engagements.

Uploading SARIF to GitHub Security

For example, after Gitleaks, Semgrep or Trivy produces a SARIF file, we use GitHub's SARIF upload action:

- name: Upload SARIF to GitHub Security
  uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
  with:
    sarif_file: semgrep.sarif

The important part is that the scanner produces the SARIF file first.

GitHub then consumes that file and displays the findings under the repository's security features.

We also use categories for scanners where multiple SARIF results are uploaded:

- name: Upload Trivy SARIF
  uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
  with:
    sarif_file: trivy-node-frontend.sarif
    category: trivy-node-frontend-image

The category helps distinguish results from different scans.

gh code scanning

Reports via the tools we use

Workflow artifacts

SARIF is useful for GitHub Security, but sometimes we also want to keep the actual report produced by a workflow.

For example, ZAP produces an XML report that we send to DefectDojo. We can also upload that report as a GitHub Actions artifact.

The basic pattern is:

- name: Upload ZAP report
  uses: actions/upload-artifact@v4
  with:
    name: zap-dast-report
    path: report_xml.xml

This gives us three different places for the same security workflow:

Scanner
   ↓
Scan report
   ├──→ GitHub Security
   │       SARIF
   │
   ├──→ GitHub Actions Artifact
   │       Raw report
   │
   └──→ DefectDojo
           Findings

Each serves a different purpose:

GitHub Security — view security findings alongside the repository
GitHub Actions artifact — retain the raw scan report from that workflow run
DefectDojo — centrally organize and track findings across scanners and engagements

This gives the project both repository-level visibility and a centralized security view without making DefectDojo responsible for generating the findings itself.

Platform Implementation Continued

Kyverno is installed during cluster bootstrap.

File: terraform/bootstrap.sh

helm upgrade --install kyverno \
  kyverno/kyverno \
  --namespace kyverno \
  --create-namespace \
  --timeout 8m \
  --set features.policyExceptions.enabled=true \
  --set features.policyExceptions.namespace=argocd

The last two options enable Kyverno PolicyException support and tell Kyverno which namespace to use for those exception resources.

--set features.policyExceptions.enabled=true
--set features.policyExceptions.namespace=argocd

The argocd namespace here is our choice. Kyverno does not require PolicyExceptions to be stored there. We chose argocd because the policies and their exceptions are managed through our GitOps setup. The important part is that the namespace configured here must match the namespace where you create the PolicyException resources.

In this lab, the policies and policyexceptions are stored under:

k8s/kyverno/policies/

We have several policies in the repository, but rather than showing every one here, let's look at one example and then one exception. The rest are available in the repository.

Image tag security

One of our policies makes sure container images use an explicit tag and prevents the use of :latest:

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
  name: image-tag-security

spec:
  validationFailureAction: Enforce

  rules:
    - name: require-image-tag
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds: [Pod]
      validate:
        message: "Container images must use an explicit image tag."
        pattern:
          spec:
            containers:
              - image: "*:*"

    - name: disallow-latest-tag
      match:
        any:
          - resources:
              kinds: [Pod]
      validate:
        message: "The latest image tag is not allowed."
        pattern:
          spec:
            containers:
              - image: "!*:latest"

This is a ClusterPolicy, so it can apply across the cluster.

The two rules handle related but separate checks:

require-image-tag makes sure an image has an explicit tag.
disallow-latest-tag specifically rejects the :latest tag.

Because the policy uses Enforce, a Pod that violates either rule is rejected during admission.

We also have policies for resource requests and limits and for restricting images to trusted registries. You can see the complete set of policies used in this lab in the repository.

Policy exception

Policies are intentionally strict, but sometimes a platform component has a legitimate reason not to satisfy a general rule.

In our case, Traefik needs exceptions for some of the policies:

apiVersion: kyverno.io/v2
kind: PolicyException

metadata:
  name: traefik-resource-exception
  namespace: argocd

spec:
  exceptions:
    - policyName: resource-security
      ruleNames:
        - require-resource-requests
        - require-resource-limits

    - policyName: trusted-image-registries
      ruleNames:
        - validate-image-registry

  match:
    any:
      - resources:
          kinds: [Deployment, Pod]
          namespaces: [traefik]
          names: [traefik, traefik-*]

This exception is deliberately narrow. It does not disable the policies globally — the specified rules are excluded only for the matching Traefik Deployment and Pods in the traefik namespace.

Notice that the PolicyException itself is stored in the argocd namespace (where Kyverno looks for exceptions), while the workload being excepted is in the traefik namespace. These are two different things:

namespace: argocd — where the PolicyException resource is stored.
namespaces: [traefik] — which workloads the exception applies to.

Deployment through ArgoCD

The policies are stored in Git and deployed through ArgoCD.

File: k8s/argo-apps/kyverno-policy.yml

apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Application
metadata:
  name: kyverno-policies
  namespace: argocd

spec:
  project: default
  source:
    repoURL: https://github.com/sagarkpanda/otel-labs-platform
    path: k8s/kyverno

  destination:
    namespace: kyverno

  syncPolicy:
    automated:
      prune: true
      selfHeal: true

This gives us the full flow:

Policy in Git
    ↓
ArgoCD
    ↓
Kyverno
    ↓
Admission webhook
    ↓
Workload allowed or rejected

4. Falco Implementation

Falco is installed during platform bootstrap alongside the other cluster components.

File: terraform/bootstrap.sh

helm upgrade --install falco \
  falcosecurity/falco \
  --namespace falco \
  --create-namespace \
  --timeout 8m \
  --set tty=true \
  --set falcosidekick.enabled=true \
  -f "$REPO_ROOT/falco/custom-rules.yml"

The project also contains the custom Falco rules used by the installation.

The runtime layer therefore sits after admission:

Kubernetes admission
        ↓
      Kyverno
        ↓
   Workload starts
        ↓
       Falco
        ↓
Runtime behavior detection

Falco covers runtime activity such as:

unauthorized container escapes
privilege escalation attempts
unexpected network connections
filesystem modifications
suspicious process execution

The important thing is that these are runtime observations. The workload has already passed the Kubernetes admission stage.

5. OWASP ZAP Implementation

The final application-security check happens against the deployed application itself.

File: .github/workflows/zap.yml

name: OWASP ZAP DAST

on:
  push:
    branches: [main]

env:
  DAST_TARGET_URL: http://otel.sagarpanda.com

jobs:
  zap:
    name: ZAP Full Scan
    if: github.event.head_commit.committer.username == 'github-actions[bot]'
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest

    steps:
      - name: Check application availability
        id: check_url
        run: |
          if curl --fail --silent --max-time 30 \
            "${DAST_TARGET_URL}" > /dev/null; then
            echo "reachable=true" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          else
            echo "reachable=false" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
          fi

      - name: Run OWASP ZAP Full Scan
        if: steps.check_url.outputs.reachable == 'true'
        uses: zaproxy/action-full-scan@v0.13.0
        with:
          target: ${{ env.DAST_TARGET_URL }}
          rules_file_name: '.zap/rules.tsv'
          cmd_options: '-I -x report_xml.xml'
          artifact_name: 'zap-dast-report'
          fail_action: false

      - name: Upload ZAP Results to DefectDojo
        if: steps.check_url.outputs.reachable == 'true'
        run: |
          curl -X POST \
            "${{ secrets.DEFECTDOJO_URL }}/api/v2/reimport-scan/" \
            -F "scan_type=ZAP Scan" \
            -F "file=@report_xml.xml" \
            -F "product_type_name=SP Org" \
            -F "product_name=Otel Labs" \
            -F "engagement_name=App Sec Engagement" \
            -F "test_title=OWASP ZAP DAST"

The workflow first checks whether the application is reachable. If it is, ZAP runs against the live application.

It is triggered by the github-actions[bot] commit used in the GitOps promotion flow.

The ZAP action can also open a GitHub issue automatically by setting issue: true. An HTML report is also generated alongside the XML and JSON for easier reading.

owasp zap report

ZAP HTML report

The scan does not block the workflow because fail_action is set to false; the result is instead reported and sent to DefectDojo.

End-to-End Flow {#e2e-flow}

Now all of the individual pieces fit together:

Developer
    ↓
otel-labs
    │
    ├── Gitleaks
    ├── Semgrep
    ├── Trivy FS
    │
    ↓
Build container images
    ↓
Trivy Image
    ↓
GHCR
    ↓
GitOps update
    ↓
otel-labs-platform
    │
    ├── Gitleaks
    ├── Trivy Terraform
    └── Trivy Kubernetes
    ↓
ArgoCD
    ↓
Kubernetes
    ↓
Kyverno
    │
    ├── allow
    └── reject
    ↓
Running workload
    ↓
Falco
    ↓
Runtime detection
    ↓
OWASP ZAP
    ↓
DefectDojo

The important part is that these tools are not doing the same job.

Gitleaks        → secrets
Semgrep         → source-code security
Trivy FS        → dependencies
Trivy Image     → container artifacts
Trivy Config    → Terraform and Kubernetes configuration
Kyverno         → admission-time enforcement
Falco           → runtime behavior
OWASP ZAP       → live application testing
DefectDojo      → centralized findings

Deployment & Setup {#deployment}

Prerequisites

EKS cluster deployed from the OTel on EKS project, steps below

Step 1: Bootstrap the cluster

Apply the Terraform configuration to create the EKS cluster. During cluster creation, the bootstrap script installs Argo CD, Kyverno and Falco.

The relevant Helm repositories and installations are:

helm repo add argo https://argoproj.github.io/argo-helm
helm repo add kyverno https://kyverno.github.io/kyverno/
helm repo add falcosecurity https://falcosecurity.github.io/charts

helm upgrade --install kyverno kyverno/kyverno \
  --namespace kyverno \
  --create-namespace \
  --timeout 8m \
  --set features.policyExceptions.enabled=true \
  --set features.policyExceptions.namespace=argocd

helm upgrade --install argocd argo/argo-cd \
  -n argocd \
  --timeout 8m

helm upgrade --install falco falcosecurity/falco \
  --namespace falco \
  --create-namespace \
  --timeout 8m \
  --set falcosidekick.enabled=true \
  -f falco/custom-rules.yml

Once the cluster is ready, you can create the otel-labs application as usual by applying the Argo CD root application. If you want to access the Argo CD UI, you can also create the Argo CD ingress.

For the complete application deployment steps, refer to the OTel on EKS guide.

FalcoSidekick

FalcoSidekick is enabled in the Falco installation above:

--set falcosidekick.enabled=true

This enables the communication path between Falco and FalcoSidekick, allowing Falco events to be forwarded to the destinations configured through Sidekick.

If you want to access the FalcoSidekick UI, enable the UI as part of the Helm installation and create an ingress for it.

You can also configure FalcoSidekick to forward Falco alerts to the OTel platform by updating its ConfigMap.

If you only want to verify that Falco is detecting events and do not need FalcoSidekick or its UI, you can omit --set falcosidekick.enabled=true. Falco can run without Sidekick; Sidekick is used when you want to forward and manage the Falco events through additional outputs.

Step 2: Configure GitHub secrets

Set the required DefectDojo secrets in both repositories:

Settings → Secrets and variables → Actions

DEFECTDOJO_URL=https://defectdojo.example.com
DEFECTDOJO_API_KEY=your-api-token

You can clone the ◉ django-DefectDojo repository and run it with Docker Compose to get DefectDojo running locally.

If you run DefectDojo this way, you can use a Cloudflare Tunnel to expose it with a URL that can be reached by your GitHub Actions workflows.

cloudflared tunnel --url http://localhost:8080

Once you have logged in to DefectDojo, click on your user profile → API V2 Key to get the API key used by the workflows.

After starting DefectDojo with Docker Compose, you can create a user from the uwsgi container:

docker compose exec uwsgi python manage.py createsuperuser

Follow the prompts to set the username, email address and password.

Step 3: Verify workflows

otel-labs

Actions → Gitleaks
Actions → Semgrep
Actions → Build, Scan, Push

otel-labs-platform

Actions → Gitleaks
Actions → Trivy Config Scan
Actions → OWASP ZAP DAST

Kyverno and Falco are deployed as part of the platform bootstrap/GitOps setup. Use the earlier testing steps ☝️ Falco and Kyverno

Step 4: Review DefectDojo

Dashboard → Products → Otel Labs

The configured scans feed their results into the relevant DefectDojo engagements.

Key Takeaways {#takeaways}

Layer	Tool	What it covers
Secrets	Gitleaks	Git history and current repository
SAST	Semgrep	Source-code security
Dependencies	Trivy FS	Application dependencies
Image	Trivy Image	Built container images
Infrastructure	Trivy Config	Terraform and Kubernetes configuration
Admission	Kyverno	Kubernetes policy enforcement
Runtime	Falco	Suspicious behavior in running workloads
DAST	OWASP ZAP	The deployed web application
Findings	DefectDojo	Centralized security findings

Troubleshooting {#troubleshooting}

Workflows Not Running

Check paths-ignore and the path filters in the workflow files. Some changes intentionally do not trigger every scan.

Gitleaks Too Noisy

Reduce false positives using the repository's Gitleaks configuration/ignore rules.

Kyverno Blocking Legitimate Pods

Use a scoped PolicyException for legitimate workloads rather than disabling the policy globally.

Next Steps {#next-steps}

Network policies — Restrict pod-to-pod communication.
Vault — Use Hashicorp Vault for secret management.

Why this setup?

Table of Contents

Part I: Application Security {#part-i}

1. Gitleaks: Secret Detection

2. Semgrep: SAST

Dependabot: Automated Dependency Updates

3. Trivy FS: Dependency / SCA Scanning

4. Trivy Image: Container Scanning

Part II: Platform Security {#part-ii}

1. Gitleaks: Platform Repository

2. Trivy Config: Terraform and Kubernetes

The Platforms

Runtime Security: Falco

Syscalls

eBPF

Falco rules

Try it manually

Local — Falco and Falcosidekick

Kubernetes Admission Control: Kyverno

What can Kyverno do?

Audit vs Enforce

Policy as code

Policy exceptions

What we will enforce in this lab

Policy exceptions

Try it manually

Centralized Findings: DefectDojo

How DefectDojo setup is organized

UI vs API

Reimporting scan results

Automating DefectDojo from GitHub Actions

Closing and reactivating findings

GitHub Security and Workflow Artifacts

Uploading SARIF to GitHub Security

Workflow artifacts

Platform Implementation Continued

Image tag security

Policy exception

Deployment through ArgoCD

4. Falco Implementation

5. OWASP ZAP Implementation

End-to-End Flow {#e2e-flow}

Deployment & Setup {#deployment}

Prerequisites

Step 1: Bootstrap the cluster

FalcoSidekick

Step 2: Configure GitHub secrets

Step 3: Verify workflows

Step 4: Review DefectDojo

Key Takeaways {#takeaways}

Troubleshooting {#troubleshooting}

Workflows Not Running

Gitleaks Too Noisy

Kyverno Blocking Legitimate Pods

Next Steps {#next-steps}

References {#references}

Related